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The paper examines the Porter and induced-innovation hypotheses in a firm model where: (i) the 
firm has a vintage capital technology with two complementary factors, energy and capital ; (ii) 
scrapping is endogenous; (iii) technological progress is energy-saving and endogenous through 
purposive R&D investment; (iv) the innovation rate increases with R&D investment and 
decreases with complexity; (v) the firm is subject to emission quotas which put an upper bound 
on its energy consumption at any date; (vi) energy and capital prices are exogenous. Balanced 
growth paths are first characterized, and a comparative static analysis is performed to study a kind 
of long-term Porter and induced-innovation hypotheses. In particular, it is shown that tighter 
emission quotas do not prevent firms to grow in the long-run, thanks to endogenous innovation, 
but they have an inverse effect on the growth rate of profits. Some short-term dynamics are also 
produced, particularly, to analyze the role of initial conditions and energy prices in optimal firm 
behavior subject to environmental regulation. Among numerous results, we show that (i) firms 
which are historically “small” polluters find it optimal to massively pollute in the short run: 
during the transition, new and clean machines will co-exist with old and dirty machines in the 
productive sectors, implying an unambiguously dirty transition; (ii) higher energy prices induce a 
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1. Introduction 
The arguments for environmental regulation are usually based on what has come to be 
known as the Porter hypothesis. Porter (1991) and Porter and van der Linde (1995) 
argued that at least in some sectors, a carefully designed environmental regulation as a 
key feature of industrial policy can increase firm competitiveness by encouraging 
innovation in environmental technologies. So far, this hypothesis has been the target of 
numerous studies in several disciplines, including economics, with highly diverging 
conclusions. In particular, many case studies have been performed, reaching different 
conclusions depending on firms, industries, countries. An excellent compilation of such 
case studies can be found in Parto and Herbert-Copley (2007). 
A similar hypothesis, popularized by Hicks (1932) and widely applied to environmental 
economics, especially in its energy part (see Newell, Jaffee and Stavins, 1999, for a 
seminal contribution), is the so-called induced-innovation hypothesis. According to 
Hicks, the change of relative prices of production inputs stimulates innovation, an 
innovation of a particular type, directed to save the production factor that becomes 
relatively expensive. In the context of the energy consumption debate, this hypothesis 
simply stipulates that in periods of rapidly rising energy prices (relative to other inputs), 
economic agents will find it more profitable to develop alternative technologies, that is, 
energy-saving technologies. Just like the Porter hypothesis, the induced-innovation 
hypothesis in its energy-saving version has been intensively studied in recent years, with 
again highly diverging outcomes, depending mainly on the aggregation levels considered 
in the studies. In their well-known work, Newell, Jaffee and Stavins (1999) concluded 
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that a large portion of efficiency improvements in US manufacturing seems to be 
autonomous, and therefore not driven by the Hicksian mechanism outlined above.  
 
Be it stimulated by tightening environmental regulation, caused by the gradual exhaustion 
of fossil resources, dictated by international agreements like the Kyoto Protocol or by 
rapidly increasing energy-prices, the role of innovation at the firm level is the key in the 
two hypotheses described above. It explains why these hypotheses are actually shaping a 
substantial part of the environmental literature in economics. If the firms do effectively 
respond to the latter constraints and circumstances by doing more R&D, then the 
“environmental problem”, understood as the burden involved by environmental 
constraints on economic development, can be partially solved. This refers to the so-called 
“Win-Win” outcome mentioned by Porter: innovative firms would not suffer any 
productivity slump while contributing decisively to a clean environmental and sustainable 
development. 
 
This paper is devoted to understanding how and under which conditions, if any, firms 
would engage in R&D investments under environmental constraints and/or rising energy 
prices. In contrast to numerous papers written in this area (notably in the macroeconomic 
literature), which typical consider the R&D conducted outside the firms by specialized 
entities (see, for example, Hart, 2004), we start with the key assumption that firms, 
confronted with environmental constraints, may decide to individually engage in R&D 
activities. We do consider such an extension as essential to get through the puzzle, and 
there are several reasons for this approach to be preferred: 
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i) First of all, the role of “production” firms in the development of clean 
technologies cannot be under-scored because most environmental problems are 
firm or industry specific and cannot be simply solved by importing technologies. 
We shall develop this idea in the next section when describing the concrete case 
of the chlor-alkali industry in Japan (Yarime, 2007). 
ii) Second, it has been repeatedly established that at least in the case of large 
corporations (see Carraro and Siniscalco, 1994), firms tend to respond to 
environmental policy measures through innovations, not by switching inputs or 
reducing output. 
iii) Last but not least, as mentioned by several authors (among them, Carraro and 
Siniscalco, quoted just above), very high taxes are needed to bring down CO2 
emissions in the absence of innovations. This justifies the approach taken in this 
paper: understanding how the firms (for example, subject to pollution quotas) 
engage individually in R&D is indeed a key task. 
 
Throughout this paper, we shall consider vintage capital technologies. Capital goods 
produced at different dates embody different technologies, the youngest vintages are the 
most energy-saving, and, therefore, the least polluting. Beside realism, working with 
vintage capital production functions allows to capture some key elements of the problem 
under consideration, which would be lost under the typical assumption of homogenous 
capital. For instance, facing an emission tax, firms are tempted to downsize. However, in 
a typical framework where the firm also chooses the optimal age structure of capital, 
which is the main additional control variable in vintage capital models, downsizing 
entails modernization: the older and, thus, the dirtier machines and technologies are then 
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removed. For productivity analysts, this is good news: contrary to the typical framework 
with homogenous capital, we have a clear productivity-enhancing effect of emission 
taxes in such a framework, thus giving a chance to the Porter ``Win-Win´´ outcome to 
arise, even in the absence of firms’ innovative activities.  
 
Indeed, whether such an indirect modernization effect can compensate the so-called 
profit-emission effect according to which profits decline under emission taxes sounds as a 
highly intriguing question. Very few papers have tried to deal with this issue so far, 
manly due to the sophisticated mathematical structure of vintage capital models. Two 
valuable exceptions should be mentioned here. Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999) 
provided the first inspection into this problem. They concluded that the costs of 
environmental regulation were mitigated if firms responded to emission taxes by 
scrapping the older and dirtier technologies. Therefore, the indirect modernization effect 
offsets a substantial part of the negative profit-emission negative effect, but not totally. 
Feichtinger, Hartl, Kort and Veliov (2005) introduced a better specification of embodied 
technological progress underlying the considered vintage capital structure. They 
concluded that if learning costs are incorporated into the analysis (that’s running new 
machines at their full productivity potential takes time), then the magnitude of the 
modernization effect is strongly reduced, and environmental regulation has a markedly 
negative effect on industry profits. 
 
Our paper extends the two previous papers, where the pace of technological progress is 
kept exogenous, and endogenizes R&D decisions. We have already justified largely why 
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this endogenization is necessary for a proper appraisal of the ``environmental problem” 
as defined above. We shall refine our arguments in this respect in the next factual section.  
 
We characterize optimal firm behavior both asymptotically and in the long-run, and we 
extract several new results, thanks to the endogenous nature of technological progress. In 
particular, we outline here three crucial results: 
i) In the long-run, tighter emission quotas coupled with liquidity constraints do not 
prevent firms from growing in the long-run, thanks to endogenous innovation, and 
this is good news. However, these constraints have an inverse effect on the 
growth rate of profits. In other terms, while R&D is crucial for firms to keep on 
growing despite environmental and financial constraints, we get the natural 
outcome (at least, at the firm level) that no Porter-hypothesis is expected to arise 
in the long-run, namely, strengthening environmental regulation does not improve 
the situation of the firms in the long-run, under the conditions of the model (price-
taking liquidity-constrained firms).  
ii) In the short-run, the results are even clearer. For example, we establish that firms 
which are historically “small” polluters find it optimal to massively pollute in the 
short run: during the transition, new and clean machines will co-exist with old and 
dirty machines in the productive sectors, implying an unambiguously dirty 
transition. Therefore, the model provides micro-foundations for an essential part 
of the so-called Environmental Kuznets Curve. 
iii) Last but not least, we show that under some specific but reasonable 
circumstances, higher energy prices induce shorter lifetime for capital goods but 
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they depress investment in both new capital and R&D, featuring a kind of reverse 
Hicksian mechanism. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to describing some salient 
characteristics of the ”environmental regulation” taken at the concrete firm level, 
borrowing from the writing of some technologists. Section 3 formally describes our firm 
optimization problem and outlines some of its peculiarities. Section 4 derives the 
optimality conditions and interprets them. Section 5 is concerned with the long-term 
optimal behavior of firms and Section 6 presents some implications for optimal short-
term dynamics. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Insight from technologists 
We start with a short description of the case of the chlor-alkali Japanese industry, which 
is in our view an excellent illustration of firm’s behavior under environmental regulation 
in an energy-saving context. We then switch to other salient features of the problem, as 
depicted by several technologists. 
 
2.1. An illustration: the chlor-alkali industry in Japan 
This sub-section is entirely based on Yarime (2007). The chlor-alkali industry  produces 
chlorine and caustic soda through electrolysis. Because it involves electrolysis, it is one 
of the major energy consumers in the Japanese industry.5 In this context, a major concern 
                                                 
5 Yarime (2007) reports that about 3% of total industry electricity consumption in Japan can be attributed to 
the chlor-alkali industry in 1996, which also accounts for about one-fifth of total chemical industry in this 
year.  
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of the firms operating in this industry is to develop innovative techniques in order to 
reduce energy consumption. Of course, the R&D activities conducted to this end were not 
all dictated by environmental constraints or rising energy prices. This was certainly not 
the case in the 60s for example. On the other hand, the technological context of such an 
industry is highly interesting for the study of energy-saving innovation processes. 
 
To this context, one has to add a sensitive environmental issue, linked to the electrolysis 
technique used, which has motivated an increasingly severe environmental regulation 
from the late 60s. Indeed, at that time, the electrolytic process employed was a mercury 
process, thus based on a highly toxic substance. It was relatively quickly established that 
the mercury released by the chlor-alkali industry to the neighboring seas was the cause of 
the so-called Minimata disease, which caused about 700 victims in that time.6 The 
Japanese authorities started ruling against chlor-alkali industry from the mid-60s, 
stipulating among others quantitative limits to control the levels of mercury released to 
environment. In 1974, the Japanese authorities took a step further against the industry and 
require the conversion of as many mercury plants as possible to the unique alternative at 
that time, the made-in-USA diaphragm electrolytic process, by the end of 1975.7  
 
Now, comes the most interesting part of the story. Because the alternative diaphragm 
process was clearly disadvantageous in terms of energy consumption compared to the 
mercury process, and given the period of rapidly increasing energy prices (recall the anti-
mercury process regulation was taken during the first oil crisis), it quickly appeared to 
                                                 
6 Minimata disease refers to Minimata Bay in the Southern part of Japan, where the first cases of mercury 
poisoning were discovered. 
7 Interestingly, as mentioned by Yarime (2007), the final decision to rule out the mercury process was taken 
when the process was accounting for 95% of total capacity, which of course created heavy tensions 
between the producers and the Japanese authorities. See more in Yarime’s contribution. 
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both producers and authorities that there was an urgent need to develop an alternative 
electrolytic process, less energy-consuming than the diaphragm process and less polluting 
than the mercury process.8 This motivated a massive R&D effort in developing a third 
electrolytic process, the ion exchange membrane process, and the suspension by May 
1977 of the conversion program (to the diaphragm process technology). As mentioned by 
Yarime (2007), although the idea of using ion exchange membranes had been known by 
many years at that time, a significant R&D effort was needed to develop ion exchange 
membranes adapted to the chlor-alkali industry, and the number of patent applications by 
Japanese firms increased markedly after the mid-70s and until the early 80s in this field. 
In 1998, about 90% of the Japanese chlor-alkali plants used the ion exchange membrane 
process.  
 
2.2. Other features 
Several other insights can be gained from the technology literature concerning the 
innovative processes in the industry subject to environmental constraints. We shall 
mention two of them, which will be explicitly considered in our theoretical set-up. 
i) The role of financial constraints: This type of constraints is, of course, crucial 
as long as one is concerned with technological renovation, especially when it is 
imposed by law. If the firms do not face any type of financial constraints, then 
they could finance R&D expenditures with no limit, which is certainly unrealistic. 
In the case of the Japanese chlor-alkali industry described above, financial 
constraints are even more crucial since the whole industry was required to switch 
                                                 
8 Yarime also mentioned some problems related to the poor quality of the caustic soda produced by the 
diaphragm technique. This point goes beyond our framework but it is certainly highly intriguing.  
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technology in a limited amount of time (see the very interesting description of the 
debate between the chlor-alkali industry and the Japanese authorities on the 
financing of the required R&D programs in Yarime’s paper). 
ii) The role of technological complexity: It is very well known that the success of 
R&D programs depends, among others, on the complexity and sophistication of 
the technologies to be up-graded. Complexity is therefore a fundamental 
ingredient of early technology adoption theories à la Nelson and Phelps (1964) 
and of more recent standard growth theory (see for example, Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 1995, chapter 7, or Segerstrom, 2000). Needless to say, the problem of 
technological sophistication is also a sensitive barrier to technological progress 
because of limited amount of available skills and hi-tech capital (see Chudnowsky 
and Lopez, 2007, pp 88-121, for the Argentinian case).  
We shall take these aspects into account in the firm generic problem addressed hereafter. 
 
3. The firm problem 
We shall consider the problem of a firm seeking to maximize the net profit that takes into 
account the energy consumption E(t), the investment R(t) to R&D, and the investment 
µ(t) into new capital:  
    
,a,R
rt dtttktRtEtptQeI µµ max)]()()()()()([
0
⎯→⎯−−−= ∫∞ −                                 (1) 
where k(t) is the given unit capital price (per capacity unit), p(t) is the given energy price, 
e-rt is the discounting factor.  Here Q(t) is the total product output at t,    
                   ,)()(
)(
ττµ dtQ
t
ta
∫=                                                                                     (2) 
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                 c(t) = Q(t) − p(t)E(t) − R(t) − k(t)µ(t)                                                          (3) 
is the net profit or cash flow. We therefore postulate a Leontief vintage capital production 
function as in Boucekkine, Germain and Licandro (1997, 1999) or Hritonenko and 
Yatsenko (1996, 2005). In equation (2), a(t) measures the vintage index of the oldest 
machine still in use at time t, or in other words, t-a(t) measures the scrapping time at date 
t. The whole complexity of the optimization problem considered in this paper comes from 
the fact that a is a control variable, which is quite unusual in economic theory. We shall 
come back to this point in detail later. For now, let us notice that we do not assume any 
output-augmenting (embodied or disembodied) technological progress: whatever the 
vintage τ  is, all machines produce one unit of output. In our framework, the 
technological progress is exclusively energy-saving, which is the key component of the 
debate around technological progress and environmental sustainability.  
In contrast to the related literature (notably to Feichtinger et al., 2005, 2006 and 2007), 
we assume that firms invest in R&D. It reflects the fact that the environmental problems 
(here linked to energy consumption and subsequent CO2 emissions) are firm-specific, so, 
the firms cannot simply import preexisting cleaner technologies. And even if a relevant 
technology could be imported (like the diaphragm technique in our Japanese industry 
case), a costly adoption work is needed. Let us call β(τ) the level of the energy-saving 
technological progress at date t. We postulate that this level evolves endogenously 
according to:  
                            ,0       ,
)(
))((
)(
)( >= dRf' d τβ
τ
τβ
τβ                                                             (4) 
where f is increasing and concave: df/dR>0, d2f/dR2<0. Equation (4) deserves a few 
comments. It basically stipulates that the rate of energy-saving technical progress is an 
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increasing (and concave) function of the R&D effort and a decreasing function of its 
level. The latter specification is designed to reflect the negative impact of technological 
complexity on R&D success. The parameter d measures the extent to which complexity 
impacts the rate of technological progress (just like in Segerstrom, 2000, for example). It 
will play an important role hereafter, which is consistent with the available evidence, 
mentioned in Section 2, on the role of technological complexity in the adoption of (clean) 
technologies. 
We also assume that the energy-saving technological progress is fully embodied in new 
capital goods, which implies, keeping the Leontief structure outlined above, that total 
energy consumption is given by  
                .
)(
)()(
)(
ττβ
τµ dtE
t
ta
∫=                                                                           (5)                   
We now introduce the environmental constraint to the firm, through a simple emission 
quota constraint:  
                E(t) ≤ Emax(t),                                                                                          (6)                        
where the regulation function Emax(t) is given. Implicit in our setting, the consumption of 
of energy is the sole source of pollution through CO2 emissions. Restricting energy 
consumption is therefore a direct way to limit pollution.  The firms are also subject to a 
second type of constraint, financial constraint, which we also model in a straightforward 
way by imposing the positivity of cash-flows, c(t), at any date t, as we will see later. 
 
Let us now summarize the optimal control problem to tackle.    
The unknown functions are: 
♦ the investment µ(t), µ(t)≥0, into new capital (measured in the capacity units) 
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♦ the R&D investment R(t), R(t)≥0, and the technology β(t),   
♦ the capital scrapping time t-a(t), a′(t) ≥ 0,  a(t) < t, 
♦ the output Q(t), cash-flow c(t),  and energy consumption E(t),  t∈[0,∞). 
 
The constraints are given by the environmental constraint (6), plus the positivity, 
liquidity constraint and other regularity conditions: 
        R(t) ≥ 0,      c(t) ≥ 0,      µ (t) ≥ 0,            a′(t) ≥ 0,     a(t) < t,                      (7)  
The condition a′(t)≥0 is a standard constraint in vintage capital models implying that 
scrapped machines cannot be reused. We shall also specify the initial conditions as 
follows: 
                    a(0) = a0<0,   β(a0)=β0,   µ(τ) ≡ µ 0(τ),  R(τ)≡R0(τ),  τ∈[a0,0].               (8) 
 
The optimal control problem (1)-(8) has several mathematical peculiarities (compared to 
the typical optimal control problem in economics), which makes it quite hard to tackle. 
We come back to the technical part in the next Section 4 where the necessary optimality 
conditions are developed. Before, let us stress the following economic aspects: 
i) Technological progress modelling 1: Our formalization simplifies to a 
manageable mathematical complexity the chlor-alkali industry example described 
in Section 2. In particular, while the incentives to develop alternative technologies 
were driven by distinct purely ecological motivations (get rid of the mercury-
based electrolytic process) and energy-saving reasons, the two motivations are 
merged in our modelling: the firm aims at developing energy-saving technologies 
to lower its energy expenditures and to cope with environmental regulation. On 
the other hand, while the technological menus seem to be limited to three in the 
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chlor-industry case (mercury, diaphragm and ion exchange membrane processes), 
the R&D effort was actually continuous in time, resulting in a non-lumpy 
trajectory of patents as documented in Yarime (2007). Hence, our continuous time 
setting is still adequate. 
ii) Technological progress modelling 2: In our modelling, technological 
improvements affect only the new capital goods. This is crystal clear in equation 
(5) giving total energy consumption. Of course, this need not be the case in 
general. A part of energy-saving innovations is probably disembodied, and a more 
general formulation of the problem taking into account this aspect would, in 
particular, replace the ODE on β(t), by a PDE on β(τ,t). This extension is out of 
the scope of this paper. As one can guess, our optimal control problem (1)-(8) is 
already extremely tricky. Moving to PDEs specifications of technological 
progress would oblige us to resort massively to numerical simulation (as in 
Feichtinger et al., 2006), which we want precisely to avoid. On the other hand, 
part of technological innovations in the workplace are of course imported, but 
nevertheless hardly at zero cost. Therefore, they cand be ``imported’’ in the 
technological variable R(t) without any decisive loss of generality. 
iii) Technological progress modelling 3: As in Hart (2004), we can extend the 
model by distinguishing between R&D devoted to increase output, and R&D 
environmental-friendly. This might probably change some of the results of the 
paper. Given the induced algebraic cost, we have decided to restrict our attention 
to energy-saving technological progress, which also happens to be the 
environmental-friendly innovations in our set-up. 
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iv) Environmental regulation: In this paper, we focus on emission quotas, as this 
seems to be one of the salient characteristics of environmental regulation both at 
the national and transnational levels. Other policy instruments could have been 
considered  like emission taxes (see Xepapadeas and De Zeeuw, 1999) for 
example. Moreover, it could be interesting to compare policy tools regarding the 
fulfillment of the Porter hypothesis. This goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
4. Extremum conditions 
We now move the derivation of the optimality conditions. For mathematical convenience, 
we change the unknown (decision) variable µ(t) to 
                                                      m(t) = µ(t)/β(t),                                                   (9) 
which is also the investment into new capital (but measured in the energy consumption 
units rather than in capacity units). In the variables R and m, the optimization problem 
(1)-(8) becomes  
                              max)]()()()()()()([
,
0
m,aR
rt dttmttktRtEtptQeI ⎯→⎯−−−= ∫∞ − β (10) 
                          c(t) = Q(t) − p(t)E(t) − R(t) − k(t)β(t)m(t),                                     (11) 
                                 ,)()()(
)(
τττβ dmtQ
t
ta
∫=                                                           (12)  
               ,)()(
)(
ττ dmtE
t
ta
∫=     E(t) ≤ Emax(t),                                         (13)                   
              R(t)≥0,    m(t)≥0,     c(t) ≥ 0,      a′(t) ≥ 0,     a(t) < t,                        (14) 
              a(0) = a0<0,   β(a0)=β0,   m(τ) ≡ m0(τ),  R(τ)≡R0(τ),  τ∈[a0, 0].               (15) 
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The substitution (9) removes β(t) from equation (5) and adds it to the last term in the 
functional (10). Equation (4) for the unknown β(t) remains the same. In the case d>0, the 
solution of (4) has the form: 
                     ,))(()(
/1
0
d
dBdvvRfd ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +∫=
ττβ                                           (16) 
where the constant B=
d
d
a
dvvRfd
/1
0
0
0
0
))(()0( ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +∫= ββ is uniquely determined by the 
initial conditions (8) or (15). From now on, we work with the following explicit 
specification for endogenous technological progress:  
                                     f(R)=bRn,    0<n<1,    b>0.                                                     (17) 
By (4), this implies that the elasticity of the rate of technological progress with respect to 
R&D expenditures is constant and equal to n. The larger is n, the bigger is the efficiency 
of investing in R&D. 
 
The optimization problem (OP) (10)-(17) includes seven unknown functions R, β, m, a, 
Q, c, and E connected by four equalities (11), (12), (13), and (16). Following Hritonenko 
and Yatsenko (1996), Yatsenko (2004), and Yatsenko and Hritonenko (2005), we will 
choose R, m, and a′ as the independent variables (or controls) of the OP and consider the 
rest of the unknown functions β, m, a, Q, c, and E as the dependent (state) variables.  
The majority of optimization models of mathematical economics are treated using FOC 
(first-order conditions) for interior trajectories only. In contrast, the nature of the OP 
(10)-(17) requires taking into account the inequalities E(t)≤Emax(t), R(t)≥0, m(t)≥0, 
a′(t)≥0, a(t)<t, and c(t)≥0 on unknown variables in the constraints (13) and (14). These 
inequalities have an essential impact on extremum conditions and optimal dynamics and 
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are treated differently in the below analysis. The inequalities R≥0 and m≥0 are the 
standard constraints on control variables, which are common in the optimization theory. 
The non-standard constraints a′(t)≥0 and a(t)<t are handled following the technique 
developed by Hritonenko and Yatsenko in several papers already cited. The constraint 
E≤Emax is considered in two cases of Theorem 1 below. Finally, the constraint c≥0 is the 
most inconvenient mathematically and is checked a posteriori (see Remark 2 below).  
 
Let the given functions p, k, and Emax be continuously differentiable, and  m0 and R0 be 
continuous. To keep the OP statement correct, the smoothness of the unknown variables 
should be consistent. We will assume that the decision variables R and m (and a′ when 
necessary) are measurable almost everywhere (a.e.) on [0,∞). Then, the unknown state 
variables a, c, Q, and E in (10)-(15) are a.e. continuous on [0,∞), as established in 
Hritonenko and Yatsenko (2006). We also assume a priori that the improper integral in 
(10) converges (it will be true in all subsequent Theorems 2-4).  
The necessary condition for an extremum (NCE) in the OP (10)-(17) is given by the 
following statement  
Theorem 1. Let (R*(t), m*(t), a*(t), β*(t), Q*(t), c*(t), E*(t),), t∈[0,∞), be a solution of 
the OP (10)-(17).  
(A) If E*(t)=Emax(t) and c*(t)>0 at t∈∆⊂[0,∞), and Emax′(t)≤0, then  
                         IR'(t)≤0 at  R*(t)=0,         IR'(t)=0  at  R*(t)>0,                                  (18) 
                         Im'(t)≤0 at  m*(t)=0,         Im'(t)=0  at  m*(t)>0,    t∈∆,                     (19) 
where  
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the state variable a(t) is determined from (13), a−1(t) is the inverse function of a(t), and       
            
ddn BdRdb
1
0
)()( ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +∫=
τ ξξτβ .                                                      (22) 
(B) If E*(t)<Emax(t) and c*(t)>0 at t∈∆, then  
                  IR'(t)≤0 at  R*(t)=0,         IR'(t)=0  at  R*(t)>0,                                          
                  Im'(t)≤0 at  m*(t)=0,         Im'(t)=0  at  m*(t)>0,                                    (23) 
                 Ia’'(t)≤0  at  da*(t)/dt=0,      Ia’'(t)=0  at  da*(t)/dt>0,    t∈∆,                  
where  
     [ ] )()()()()(' )(
1
tktedptetI rtr
ta
t
m βττβτ −− −−= ∫
−
,                                           (24) 
     τττβττ damapetI r
t
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∞∫ ,                     (25) 
IR'(t) is as in (20), and β(t) is as in (22).   
 
The proof is very long and technical and we report all the details in the Appendix. The 
expressions (20), (21), (24), and (25) are the Freshet derivatives of the functional I in 
variables R, m, and a’. The derivative Im’(t) has different forms (21) and (24) depending 
on whether the restriction (13) is active or inactive. Before giving the economic 
interpretation of the optimality conditions, some technical comments are in order.  
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Remark 1. If (13) is active (Case A), then the state variable a is determined from 
m(a(t))a′(t)=m(t)− Emax′(t) and the state restriction a′≥0 on the variable a in (14) is satisfied if 
Emax′(t)≤0, t∈[0,∞). If the condition Emax′(t)≤0 fails for some t∈∆⊂[0,∞), then Theorem 1 is still 
valid in Case A if we replace the differential constraint a’(t)≥0 in (14) with the stricter constraint  
m(t) ≥ max{0, Emax′(t)} on the control m (see Hritonenko and Yatsenko, 2006, for a proof).                   
 
Remark 2. To keep mathematical complexity reasonable, we do not include the constraint c(t)≥0 
into the NCE. To be complete, Theorem 1 has to include two more cases: E*>Emax, c*=0, and 
E*=Emax, c*=0. The problem (10)-(17) in these cases should be treated as an OP with state 
constraints, which leads to significant mathematical challenges (see Hartl, Sethi and Vickson, 
1995, for an insight into this issue). As we shall see, the regime c*(t)=0 does not usually appear in 
the long-term dynamics (Section 5) and may have an impact only on the transition dynamics as 
one of possible scenarios (Section 6).  
 
Remark 3. Sufficient conditions for an extremum for such OPs are complicated and involve the 
second Freshet derivatives of the functional I. The authors derived and analyzed such condition in 
the form 0
)()(
)()( <′′′′
′′′′=
tItI
tItI
J
mmmR
RmRR at R=R*, m=m* for the Case (A) with active restriction (13). It 
is not included into this paper.    
 
Remark 4. The vintage models with endogenous TC are multi-extremal under natural conditions, 
see Chapter 6 in Hritonenko and Yatsenko (1996). We can show that the OP (10)-(17) may also 
possess two local extrema: 
(1) the trivial solution R0(t)≡0, m0(t)≡0, a0≤a0(t)≤0, t∈[0,∞). The solution is verified by its 
substitution into (20),(24),(25), then IR′(t)<0, Im′(t)<0, and Ia′′(t)<0, i.e., the NCE (23) holds. This 
local solution describes economic dynamics with no investment to technological renovation when 
the entire profit goes to the consumption goods. The trivial solution is not stable in the sense that 
some (small) positive investments in new capital and R&D can force the economic system to 
jump to the next solution.  
(2) the non-trivial solution, where R*(t),  m*(t), a*(t) are positive, at least, on some parts of the 
planning horizon [0,∞). It describes the case where the economic system installs new equipment 
and invests into science and technology. 
The paper focuses on the structure of the non-trivial solution (R*,  m*, a*). 
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Let us move now to some economic interpretations of the obtained first-order optimality 
conditions. In order to compare more easily with the existing literature, we start with the 
case (A), that is, when the environmental constraint is binding. Indeed, in such a case, the 
binding environmental constraint can be broadly viewed as an “equilibrium” condition in 
the energy market, where the quota plays the role of supply. Let us interpret the 
optimality conditions with respect to investment and R&D, the case of scrapping being 
trivially fixed by Remark 1 above. Using equations (19) and (21), the (interior) optimal 
investment rule may be rewritten as: 
    )(
)(
))((1
)(1
tked
t
ae rt
ta
t
r −− =⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −∫
−
τβ
τβτ  
   The interpretation of such a rule is quite natural having in mind the early vintage capital 
literature (notably Solow et al., 1966, and Malcomson, 1975) as exploited in Boucekkine, 
Germain and Licandro (1997). In our model, one unit of capital at date t costs k(t) or 
)(tke rt−  in present value. This is the right-hand side of the optimal rule above. The left-
hand side should therefore give us the marginal benefit from investing. Effectively, it is 
the integral of discounted gains from investing over the lifetime of a machine bought at t 
(since a-1(t) is by construction the lifetime of such a machine). At any date comprised 
between t and a-1(t), a machine bought at t will provide one unit of output but the firm has 
to pay the corresponding energy expenditures 
)(
))((
t
a
β
τβ . Given our Leontief 
specifications, 
)(
1
tβ  is the energy requirement of any machine bought at date t. ))(( τβ a  
plays therefore the role of the effective price of the input paid by the firm. How could this 
be rationalized? Simply by noticing that under a binding environmental constraint, the 
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latter mimics a clearing market condition as in the early vintage macroeconomic literature 
(see for example, Solow et al., 1966).9 In such a framework, the marginal productivities 
of energy should be equalized across vintages, implying a tight connection between the  
effective price of energy and the energy requirement of the oldest machine still operated. 
More precisely, the latter price, which happens to be the Lagrange multiplier associated 
to the binding environmental constraint, is equal to the inverse of the energy requirement 
of the oldest machine still in use, which is equal to ))(( τβ a  at any date τ comprised 
between t and a-1(t). Notice that in such a case, the effective price of energy ))(( τβ a  is 
not generally equal to p(t). The latter does not play any role since energy expenditures 
become predetermined equal to p(t)Emax(t) in the constrained regime. Things are 
completely different in the case where the environmental constraint is not binding (case B 
of Theorem 1). In such a case, the optimal investment rule becomes (following equation 
(24)): 
        )(
)(
)(1
)(1
tked
t
tpe rt
ta
t
r −− =⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −∫
−
τβ
τ , 
and ))(( τβ a = p(t) as in the firm problem studied by Malcomson (1975) (with again labor 
playing the role of energy), making a clear difference with respect to the constraint case 
A. Our framework thus extends significantly the benchmark theory to allow for situations 
in which input markets do not necessarily clear due to institutional constraints. 
 
Let us interpret now the R&D optimal rule, which is also new in the literature. Using  
(20), it is given by 
                                                 
9 In Solow et al., the role of energy is played by labor. 
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The right-hand side is simply the present value of marginal investment in R&D. The 
marginal benefit is given by the left-hand side. Contrary to the optimal investment rule, 
the gains from doing R&D last forever: the R&D investment induces a knowledge 
accumulation process, which is not subjected to obsolescence in our case, in contrast to 
capital goods. The integrand can be understood if one has in mind the maximized 
function (10) in the form  
    dttmttktRdmtpdmeI
t
ta
t
ta
rt )]()()()()()()()([
)()(0
βτττττβ −−−= ∫∫∫∞ −        
and the given endogenous law (16),(17) of motion of technological progress.  It should be 
noticed that rewriting the problem in terms of m(t), rather than in terms of investment in 
physical units µ(t), does not mean rewriting a problem with input-saving technical 
progress as a problem with output-augmenting technical progress. As one can see, at 
fixed m(t), an increase of R(t) (and, therefore, β(t)) increases not only the output Q(t) but 
also the investment expenditures through the term )()()( tmttk β . The left-hand side of the 
optimal R&D rule takes precisely into account this trade-off. On one hand, the marginal 
increase in β(τ), τ≥t, following the marginal rise in R(t), that is 
)(
)(1
τβ d
n tbnR − , impacts 
positively output by improving the efficiency of all vintages after date t. Notice that since 
machines have a finite lifetime, this effect should be computed between τ and a-1(τ) for 
each vintage τ, which explains the factor 
r
ee rar )(
1 ττ −−− − = ∫
−
−
)(1 τ
τ
a
rsdse  in the integrand. On 
 22
the other hand, the rising β(t) increases investment expenditures (for a fixed m(t)), which 
explains the negative term, )(ττ ke r− , in the integrand. 
 
We now move to the study of the system of the optimality conditions extracted above. 
We first start by seeking for exponential solutions (for naturally growing variables like 
R(t)), the so-called balanced growth paths (Section 5), which can feature a kind of long-
term dynamics, then we move to short-term dynamics (Section 6). 
5. Analysis of optimal long–term dynamics.    
 
The optimal long–term dynamics of the OP can involve interior regimes such that IR'≡0 
and Im'≡0. Let us assume that the environmental constraint (13) is active in the long run: 
E(t)=Emax(t) at t∈[tl, ∞), tl≥0 (we will study the alternative case later). The corresponding 
long-term interior regime (RΛ, mΛ, aΛ) is determined by the system of three nonlinear 
integral equations  
                                 IR'(t)=0,         Im'(t)=0,      
                         )()( max
)(
tEdm
t
ta
=∫ ττ ,     t∈[tl , ∞).                                                      (26) 
where IR'(t) and Im'(t) are determined by (20) and (21). The equations IR'(t)=0 and Im'(t)=0 
lead to  
  rt
t
r
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r
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⎤
⎢⎢⎣
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⎡ +∫∫
−
τττξξ τ
τττ
)()()()(
)(1/1
0
1
1
,   (27) 
  rtr
ta
t
d
d
t
n
d
d
a
n etkdeBdRbdBdRbd −− =⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +∫⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +∫−∫
−
)()(/)(1
)( /1
0
/1)(
0
1
τξξξξ ττ      (28) 
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at t∈[tl, ∞).   
We will explore the possibility of exponential solutions for R(t), while m(t) and t-a(t) are 
constant, to the system (26)-(28) separately in the cases n=d, n>d and n<d. First of all, 
we start with the following preliminary result: If R(t) is exponential, then β(t) is almost 
exponential and practically undistinguishable from an exponent at large t in the sense of 
the following lemma: 
 
Lemma 1. If R(t)=R0eCt for some C>0, then10  
                                          β(t) ≈ dCnt
d
dn e
Cn
bdR /
/1
/
0 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛                     (29) 
at large t. In particular, β(t)= ( ) dCntddn eCnbdR //1/0 /  if  bdR0n = CnBd.             
Proof. At R(t)=R0eCt, 
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Expanding the function (1+x)c into the series, we obtain  )(1
)(~
)( t
t
t εβ
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tε  decreases as 
e−Cnt. The lemma is proven.                      
 
                                                 
10 For brevity, we will omit the expression “at large t” when using the notation f(t) ≈ g(t) 
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We now define the concept of balanced growth paths considered. 
Definition 1. The Balanced Growth Path (BGP) is a solution (R, m, a) to (26), (27) and 
(28), where R is exponential and m(t) and t-a(t) are positive constants.  
 
If the environmental constraint (13) is not binding, then the system to be solved is  
                                IR'(t)=0,       Im'(t)=0,      Ia''(t)=0,   t∈[tl ,∞),                             (30) 
where IR'(t), Im'(t) and Ia''(t) are determined by (20), (24), and (25). As shown below, the 
optimal long-term growth with inactive regulation, E<Emax, is possible only at n>d (see 
Section 5.2.1). 
Remark 5. In the case of the inactive environmental constraint (13), it is convenient to introduce 
the Freshet derivative 
         ))((]))(()()[( )(' tamtatpttI a βρ −= ,                     (31) 
of I in a instead of the Freshet derivative (25) in a’ and use it during BGP analysis. Indeed, it is 
easy to see that if  Ia’'(t)≡0 at  t∈[ tl ,∞) for some tl≥0,  then Ia'(t)≡0 at  t∈[ tl ,∞).   
 
5.1.  Balanced growth in case n=d. 
In this case, the parameter of “R&D efficiency” n, 0<n<1, is equal to the parameter of 
“R&D complexity” d, 0<d<1. In this case, the optimal long-term growth involves the 
active environmental regulation at natural conditions. Namely, 
Lemma 2. At n=d, any interior solution (R, m, a) of the OP (10)-(17) with an 
exponentially growing R(t) involves the active environmental regulation: E(t)=Emax(t) 
starting at some tf≥0, if the following conditions hold:  
(a) the environmental constraint Emax(t) is bounded on [0,∞),  
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(b) the given energy price p(t) does not increase or increases slower than the optimal 
R(t): 0)(/)(lim =∞→ tRtpt . 
Proof. Let us consider R(t)=R0eCt, then β(t) ≈ ( ) Ctd eCbR /10 /  by Lemma 1. 
We assume that E(t)<Emax(t) at [tl,∞), tl≥0. Then, by Theorem 1, an OP interior regime (R, 
m, a) has to satisfy the nonlinear system (30). Substituting the above R and β into the 
expressions (20) and (31) for IR'(t) and Ia'(t), we obtain from (30) that  
                 ( ) )(/ )(/10 tpeCbR tCad = ,                                                      (32) 
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, t∈[tl,∞).  (33) 
Equation (32) determines a, which is such that t-a(t)→∞ at t→∞ because of the condition 
(b). Equation (33) determines m at a given a. After introducing the function f(t) = 
)(/]1[ ])([
1
tkre ttar −− −− − and differentiating (33), we have  
            )(//)/)](1([)( 1 tfbdbCdCrtm d−−−= . 
Since f(t)<1/r for any possible k and a, then m(t)>const= bdbCdCrr d /)/)](1([ 1−−− /r >0. 
Therefore, by (13), E(t) increases indefinitely at t→∞. At the condition (a), our 
assumption is wrong and E(t)=Emax(t) at some t1 > tl. Depending on the dynamics of the 
given Emax(t), it can become E(t)<Emax(t) at  some t2 >t1, but E(t)=Emax(t) at  t→∞. The 
lemma is proven.      
Though it makes use of a control variable (that is R(t)), the restriction (b) on the price of 
energy is actually quite natural . It will be refined along the way whence the optimal 
control R(t) better characterized. Indeed, as reflected in Section 6.1 below, when the 
energy price is too high (in the spirit of Lemma 2), the firm goes into a complete collapse 
with zero (optimal) investment in both equipment and R&D. Henceforth, energy 
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consumption will itself go to zero, and the emission quota constraint will not be binding 
asymptotically. In this sense, energy prices play a role in the determination: too high 
prices will discourage any type of investment, leading the firm into a collapse in the long-
run. This means that such a situation rather uncovers a case where the Hicksian 
mechanism does not work, which is hardly surprising: extreme input prices can never 
turn into investment incentives.  
Condition (b) is sufficient. In Section 5.1.2, we will see a more specific a posteriori 
restriction (45) on the energy price increase, under which a balanced growth with the 
active environmental regulation takes place. 
 
5.1.1. Growth under non-constant environment  
The purpose of this section is to produce some natural “non-existence” results. In effect, 
one would expect that “too” stringent environmental regulation can by no means imply 
any counter-balancing Porter or induced-innovation mechanism. Our results confirm this 
intuition. On the other hand, as clearly highlighted in the 1975 Malcomson’s work on the 
so-called Terborgh-Smith property related to the constancy of optimal scrapping time, for 
the model to generate regular exponential solutions with constant exponents, some strong 
conditions are needed on the forcing functions of the problem. Another insight gained by 
the analysis below is the role played by the price of capital equipment as reflected in the 
following theorem. 
 
Theorem 2. If n=d and the conditions of Lemma 2 hold, then no exponential BGP with 
positive growth exists if the environmental constraint Emax(t) monotonically decreases or 
increases OR the capital price k(t) monotonically decreases or increases.  
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Proof. By Lemma 2, E(t)=Emax(t) at [tl,∞), tl≥0. Then, by Theorem 1, an OP interior 
regime (R, m, a) has to satisfy the nonlinear system (26)-(28).  
Case 1: Emax(t) decreases (increases). Then m(t)=m(a(t))+dEmax(t)/dt by (26), hence, m(t) 
decreases (increases) from cycle to cycle and m(t)=const is not possible. 
Case 2: k(t) decreases (increases). Let us substitute R(t)=R0eCt  into the FOC (27) and (28) 
for the active environment regulation case and estimate the obtained expressions at t→∞. 
Applying Lemma 1, we find that β(t) ≈ ( ) Ctd eCbR /10 / , then (27) leads to equation (33) 
and (28) leads to 
              [ ] rtrta
t
taC etkdee −−− ≈−∫
−
)(1
)(
))((
1
τττ .                                            (34) 
The equality (34) determines a(t) at the given k(t). Its analysis shows that t-a(t)=const at 
t∈[tl,∞), is possible only if k(t)=const, t∈[tl,∞). If k(t) decreases (increases), then t-a(t) 
decreases (increases) and t-a(t)≠const.  The theorem is proven.      
 
 It is interesting to compare the impact of the environmental constraint and capital price 
on long-term dynamics. By Theorem 2, if Emax(t) decreases and/or k(t) increases over 
time, which cover the two unfavorable cases of increasingly stringent regulation and 
increasingly expensive capital goods respectively, then the BGP (in the sense of 
Definition 1) does not exist. In general, equation (33) demonstrates that the constraint  
                                                            k(t) < 1/r,                                                     (35) 
is necessary for the existence of any interior regime. However, as follows from the proof 
of Theorem 2, the negative tendency (more stringent regulation) can be compensated (at a 
certain extent) with cheaper capital goods and, then, a long-term regime with an 
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exponential R(t) (and decreasing t-a(t)) is possible. Namely, the following refinement is 
interesting to report: 
Corollary 1. Let n=d and the environmental constraint (13) be active. Then: 
(a) If k(t) growths up to the value 1/r, then no interior regime with exponential growing 
R(t) is possible.  
 (b) If Emax(t)→0 at t→∞, then no such interior regime is possible. 
(c) If both Emax(t) and k(t) decrease at t→∞, then, interior regimes with exponential 
growing R(t) are possible in some ranges of Emax and k change. In particular, if k(t) 
monotonically decreases to 0 at t→∞, then Emax(t) remains larger than a positive 
constant.  
Proof continues Case 2 of the previous proof. Let us assume that the long-term 
R(t)=R0eCt, C>0, and m(t) is continuous. Substituting R(t) into (26)-(28), we obtain (33) 
and (34). The statement (a) immediately follows from the positiveness of the left-hand 
part of (33).  
Let k(t)→0 at t→∞. Then, it follows from (34) that the unknown t-a(t) decreases and t-
a(t)→0 at t→∞. By the mean value theorem, Emax(t)=[t-a(t)]m(ξ), where a(t)<ξ<t, and 
Emax(t)≈[t-a(t)]m(a(t)). 
 Next, one can see that (33) can hold only if  
                                    )()(1
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≈ CE =const>0,                            (36) 
where CE=[r−C(1-d)](C/b)1-d/bd is found from (33). Since a-1(t)−t→0 at t→∞, the 
function f(t) = )(/]1[ ])([
1
tkre ttar −− −− − →a-1(t)−t−k(t) at t→∞.  Therefore, (36) leads to  
[a-1(t)−t−k(t)]m(t)≈CE or [t−a(t)−k(a(t))]m(a(t))≈CE. Hence, Emax(t) ≈CE+k(a(t))m(a(t)) 
 29
>CE>0  and Emax(t) can not decrease to 0 (the statement (c)). If we assume Emax(t)→0, 
then (36) can not be hold. It proves our statement (b).      
 
 Corollary 1 demonstrates that the impact of the environmental constraint on the long-
term optimal dynamics is more sensitive than the capital price. More specifically, an 
essential decrease in the environmental regulation Emax(t) cannot be compensated with the 
availability of cheaper capital goods (even if k(t)→0). No exponential growth is possible 
if  Emax(t)→0. However, exponentially decreasing capital prices are still compatible with 
exponentially rising R&D investment and decreasing finite nonzero quota emissions. 
 
We now move to the case of constant economic and institutional environment, which is 
the case where balanced growth paths typically arise (see Malcomson, 1975). 
 
5.1.2. Balanced growth under constant environment 
The following theorem establishes the existence of balanced growth paths in the sense of 
Definition 1 when the economic and institutional environment is held constant.  
 
Theorem 3 (about balanced growth).  If  
              n=d,           Emax(t)= E0=const,          k(t) = k =const,                                  (37) 
then the interior optimal regime – BGP (RΛ, mΛ, aΛ) exists,  
     RΛ(t)≈R0eCt,   QΛ(t),βΛ(t),cΛ(t) ~ eCt,     mΛ(t)=M0 =const,   aΛ(t)=t– E0 /M0,        (38) 
where the constants C and M0  are determined by the nonlinear system 
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that has a positive solution, at least, at small r. Namely, if r <<1 and 
                                              ]21[/10
/1 krbEr dd −< ,                                            (41) 
then C, 0<C<r, is a solution of the nonlinear equation  
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etp , then the interior optimal cΛ(t)>0 at large t.  
Proof. By Lemma 1, ( )  /)( 10 Ctd eCbRt ≈Λβ at n=d. The substitution of (37), (38), and 
βΛ(t) into (27) leads to 
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and, after integration, to  
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that can be rewritten as (39). Substituting (37), (38), and βΛ  to (28) gives  
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which becomes (40) after integration. 
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Equations (39) and (40) may have a positive solution C and M0 at natural assumptions. In 
particular, let r <<1. Then, presenting the exponents in (40) as the Taylor series, we 
obtain   
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Now, expressing the exponent in (39) as the Taylor series, we obtain  
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Substituting the obtained M0  into (44) leads to one equation (42) for C. To analyze this 
equation, we use the new variable Cx = and rewrite (42) as  
                                              F1(x) = F2(x),                           
where    F1(x)= ))1(( 22/2 −+− dxrx d , ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−=  
2
1)( /102 xx
rkbdExF d        
These functions are shown in Figure 1 and are such that F1(0)=0, F1’(x)>0 at 0<x< r , 
F1’(x)=0 at x= r , and F2’(x)>0 at 0<x< r , F2’(x)=0 at x= r . Also, F2(x)<0<F1(x) at 
small 0<x<<1. Therefore, to have a solution 0 < x < r  to the latter equation, it is 
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necessary and sufficient that F2( r )>F1( r ), which leads to the inequality (41). The 
sufficient condition for the uniqueness of x is F1’(x)<F2’(x) at 0<x< r , which leads to 
(43).  
Finally, let us prove that cΛ(t)>0 at large t. By (12), Ct
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Expressing the exponent as the Taylor series and using (44), we obtain  
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If 0)(lim =−∞→
Ct
t
etp , then cΛ(t)>0 at large enough t for any positive value  RΛ . 
The theorem is proven.                                                               
 
The uniqueness condition (43) is sufficient. An analysis shows that the solution is usually 
unique without this condition. The only possible case of non-uniqueness (when we need 
this condition) is when the optimal C is very close to r.  An additional analysis will be 
provided later to explore this issue. We now state some quite interesting comparative 
statics results highlighting how the balanced growth paths react to changes in the 
environmental regulation or price parameters. 
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Corollary 3. At (37) and r<<1, a decrease of E0 leads to the decrease of both optimal 
parameters C and M0, and leave the long-term lifetime of capital goods unaltered since 
M0~E0. A decrease of k decreases the optimal C, increases the optimal M0 and diminishes 
the long-term lifetime of capital goods as M0~k−1/2. 
 
More stringent environmental regulation through a decrease in E0 is bad for the growth 
rate of firms’ output and profit. Though firms respond to environmental regulation by 
exponential R&D investment efforts, the pace of such efforts is unambiguously 
negatively affected by increasingly stringent emission quotas. Strictly speaking, our long-
term analysis rules out the occurrence of a kind of Porter hypothesis since a more 
stringent environmental regulation does reduce the growth rate of firms’ output and 
profits. This extends the results of Xepapades and de Zeeuw (1999) and Feichtinger et al. 
(2005) in the missing direction. Even though the firms can respond to tighter emission 
quotas by more innovation, such an instrument does not allow to completely circumvent 
the impact of more severe regulation. In contrast, our result seems to go at odds with 
Hart’s predictions (2004) according to which an emission tax may even boost the growth 
rate of production in the economy. However, the latter paper is based on a 
macroeconomic framework where the producers, and thus the polluters, are not entitled to 
spend on innovation. This might explain the difference, among other possible reasons. 
  
Lower capital prices are good for investment (in energy consumptions units) but prove 
bad for the growth rate of firms’ output and profit. This might sound as surprising. 
Nonetheless, one should keep in mind that lower capital prices may lead to declining 
R&D investment precisely because they tend to stimulate investment in physical capital, 
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featuring a kind of substitution between investment in physical capital and investment in 
R&D. That is, the firm prefers to take profit from the exogenously decreasing capital 
prices rather than increasing its costly R&D expenditures. Since investment in R&D is 
the unique source of growth in this firm’s problem, the growth rate may be penalized by 
decreasing capital price patterns. This is exactly what our model predicts in the long –run.  
A further interesting result concerns the optimal long-term lifetime of capital goods. 
Since aΛ(t)=t– E0 /M0 , and M0~E0, it follows that a tighter environmental regulation 
leaves the optimal lifetime of capital goods unaltered. While a lower E0 does reduce the 
optimal lifetime of machines, the fact that such a tighter regulation does also push 
investment downward pushes the maximizing firm to use the fewer machines longer. The 
two effects exactly offset each other in our framework. Under decreasing prices for 
capital goods, the firm invests more and uses the machines for a shorter time. This is 
somehow consistent with the recent literature on embodied technological progress 
observing that a more rapid investment-specific technological progress (like the one 
conveyed by the information and communication technologies) reduces the relative price 
of capital goods and decreases their lifetime due to rising obsolescence costs (see for 
example Krusell, 1998). 
 
Remark 6. In Theorem 3, the BGP scale parameter R0 appears to be undetermined. We have the 
indeterminacy of the long-term dynamics under the BGP because technical progress is 
endogenous. It happens for similar problems in the endogenous growth theory. A typical example 
is the Lucas-Uzawa model (see the book of Barro and Sala-i-Martin, Economic Growth, Chapter 
5, and Boucekkine, Ruiz-Tamarit 2008).  
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Finally, it should be noted that the energy price p is not involved in the BGP (38). This is 
far from surprising since we have considered binding environmental constraints so far.11  
Indeed, under the active environmental constraint, the energy price p is not presented in 
the NCE formulas (18)-(22) and the optimal long term dynamics (RΛ, mΛ, aΛ) will be the 
same for any p up to a certain level (that depends on the chosen indeterminacy parameter 
R0). By Theorem 3, if the given energy price p(t) increases slower than the optimal RΛ(t) 
(see also condition (b) of Lemma 2), then cΛ(t)≥0 asymptotically.  
The energy price p also has an indirect effect on the optimal controls R*, a*, m*, since 
p(t) impacts the endogenous c*(t): higher p(t) means a lower level of cash c*(t), less 
money in the pocket. However, while the cash flow c*(t) is positive, the long-term firm 
optimal policy (BGP) is to invest the same in machines and in R&D. 
We shall see in Section 6 that the energy price impacts the transition dynamics in our 
model, and it may be in such a way that we will never reach the BGP (see Section 6 
below). The role of this price in the long-run dynamics is a valid question when n>d (then 
the environmental regulation is not binding) and will be considered in Section 5.2 
hereafter.  
 
Remark 7. If equation (42) has a solution 0 < C < r, then, in the general case, it has another 
solution C2, r<C2<r/(1-d). However, the larger solution C2 has no sense, since at C>r the value of 
(1) is infinite and c*(t)<0 by (45). 
 
Numerical Example 1. Let r=0.05, d=0.5, b=0.01, E0=10.5, and k=0.12. Then, the solution of the 
nonlinear system (38)-(39) is C=0.01 and mΛ(t)=M0 =2.1, which can be verified by its direct 
substitution into (38)-(39).  
 
                                                 
11 In such a case, the term p(t)E(t) of the objective function becomes  p(t)Emax(t), an exogenous term. 
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5.2.  Cases n<d and n>d. 
In these cases, no BGP in the sense of Definition 1 exists. However, a long-term regime 
with exponentially growing R and decreasing m appears to be possible at a special 
combination of given parameters.  
 
Theorem 4. Let Emax(t)= E0=const and k(t)= k=const. Then: 
(a) If n<d, then no interior optimal regime with an exponentially growing R exists.  
(b) If n>d, then an interior optimal regime (RΛ, mΛ, aΛ) such that RΛ grows exponentially, 
mΛ(t)→0 at t→∞, and E(t)<Emax(t), is possible ONLY if p(t)∼exp(Cnt/d) where C is the 
endogenous rate of RΛ(t).  
Proof. Let us substitute  
                           R(t) = R0eCt             and      m(t) = M0eDt                                           
into (27) and (28) and estimate the growth order of the obtained expressions at t→∞. 
Applying Lemma 1 and Theorem 1, we find that β(t) dCnt
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Case n<d: To keep IR'(t)=0 by (46), we need an exponentially growing m(t) with 
D=C(1−n/d)>0.  Then a(t)→t by (48) and Im'(t)<0 by (47), hence the optimal m≡0. There 
is no interior regime with C>0 possible.  
Case n>d: By (46), the restriction  
                                                       k<1/r                                                                     (49)   
is necessary for IR'(t)≥0. If (49) is valid, then, to keep IR'(t)=0 by (46), we need an 
increasing R(t)~eCt and a decreasing m(t)~eDt with D=C(1-n/d)<0. The endogenous rate 
C>0 is to be determined. 
Since m(t) decreases exponentially, we have the case E(t)<Emax(t) with the inactive 
environmental regulation for any increasing a(t). Then, by (24) and (31),   
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The equation (51) has no solution a(t) if p≡const. Let p(t)=p0est, s>0. Then (51) has the 
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Equation (52) has a unique solution a such that a(t)→(sd/Cn)t. So, we have to assume 
sd≤Cn for keeping the constraint a(t)<t. 
Let sd<Cn. Then a(t)−t→∞  by (52). Substituting p(t)=p0est  into (50) , we obtain  
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for any C>0 because of (49). Therefore, no exponentially growing interior regime is 
possible in this case.  
Finally, let sd=Cn. Then, by (52), a(t)=t−L, where L=const>0 at p0<B.  Substituting a(t) 
and p(t)=p0e(Cn/d)t into (46) and (50), we obtain a system of two nonlinear equations with 
respect to C and M0. The system is similar to the equations (39)-(40) in Theorem 3. Its 
analysis shows the possibility of positive solutions C and M0 at some restrictions on p0 
and other parameters. The theorem is proven.      
 
When n>d, the efficiency of the R&D investment appears to be higher as compared with 
the investment into the new capital. Theorem 4 concludes that, in the optimal long-time 
regime, almost all the output goes to R&D investment and the part of capital investments 
(exponentially) decreases in the total distribution of the output. Also, the environment 
constraint is not binding and we can keep a larger amount of older assets (since we buy 
an increasingly smaller amount of new capital).  
By (49), the restriction k(t)<1/r on the given capital price is necessary for the existence of 
any positive optimal regime. The energy price p(t) plays an important role in the case 
n>d, in particular, an interior regime with an exponential RΛ  optimal path is impossible if 
the energy price p(t) does not increase. Only if p(t) increases with a certain rate, then an 
interior regime with exponentially increasing RΛ and decreasing mΛ is possible. The 
increase of p(t) raises aΛ(t), that is, decreases the lifetime of capital goods. In other 
words, a kind of induced-innovation mechanism seems to be active in the case n>d, that 
is, when the R&D activity is highly efficient, so efficient that the investment devoted to 
equipment goes to zero. In such a case, the firm is in perpetually sharp modernization, 
and is not suffering at all from environmental regulation. We have to notice that this 
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interior regime is not a BGP in the sense of Definition 1 because mΛ(t) asymptotically 
tends to zero. We shall disregard such a configuration in the short-term dynamics section 
below.  
 
 
6. Transition dynamics        
From now on, we set n=d. Since we have to deal with short-term dynamics in this 
section, some comments on the initial conditions are in order. The OP solution (R*, m*, 
a*) satisfies the initial conditions (15). An essential initial condition is a(0)=a0 because 
the unknown a(t) is continuous. If a0≠aΛ(0), then the dynamics of (R*, m*, a*) involves a 
transition from the initial state a(0)=a0 to the long term interior trajectory aΛ(t) (if it 
exists). 
By (14), c(0) = Q(0)-p(0)E(0)-R(0)-k(0)β(0)m0(0) ≥ 0 at the initial state t=0, or  
       )0()()()0()0()0()0( 00
0
000
0 0
RdmdvvRBmkEp
a a
−
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ +≤+ ∫ ∫
− −
ττβ
τ
              (53) 
(otherwise, the economic system is not possible at t=0 because of too high energy and 
capital prices p(0), k(0)). Condition (59) implies two simpler constraints: 
                            p(0) < B0      and         k(0)m0(0) < E(0).                                           (54)          
Even if (53) holds, the optimal dynamics may be such that the economic system will 
never reach the environmental restriction E(t)=E0(t) because of too high energy and/or 
capital prices. Let us demonstrate the corresponding scenarios. 
 
6.1.  The collapse cases.  
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 Let E(0)<Emax(0) at the initial time .        
Scenario 1: The case of too high energy price. Let us assume that the external market 
energy price p(t) increases faster than the optimal β(t) (e.g., if β is an exponent with the 
rate larger than C in the case d=n). Then, by (25), Ia''(t)>0 for all t and the optimal 
strategy is to keep the lifetime of the capital t−a*(t) as short as possible because of the 
high energy cost p(t).  In this case, the optimal a*(t) soon becomes a*(t)=t and the 
optimal new investment m*(t)=0 is determined by the sign Im'(t)<0 in (24). By (20), 
IR'(t)<0 and the optimal R*(t)=0. So, the optimal dynamics is a situation of an economic 
collapse (no capital renovation and complete scrapping of existing capital) because of too 
high price of the resource. By (13), the variable E(t) strives to 0 and is always less than 
Emax(t). If p(t) increases with exactly the same rate as the optimal β(t), then the economy 
may grow but never reach the environmental constraint E(t)=Emax(t).  
 
 Scenario 2: The case of too high capital cost. Let the market price k(t) of new capital 
increases (not even indefinitely) and becomes k(t)≥1/r at t≥tcr for some tcr>0. Then, by 
(24), Im'(t)<0 and the optimal new investment m*(t)=0 at t≥tcr. So, the optimal strategy is 
to buy no new capital. By (20), IR'(t)<0 and the optimal R*(t)=0. By (25), Ia''(t)<0 and, 
hence, a*(t)=a0. The optimal dynamics is the economic decline (no R&D investment, no 
capital renovation and no capital scrapping) because of too high price k(t) of the new 
capital. The variable E(t)≤E(0)<Emax(0)=Emax(t), i.e., the environmental constraint is 
never reached.  
 
 41
The above scenarios do not reflect the nature of technological capital replacement. In 
Section 6.2 below, we consider cases when the optimal system dynamics involves capital 
renovation.  
The OP produces qualitatively different optimal regimes R*(t),  m*(t),  a*(t),  t∈[0,∞), 
depending on whether the environmental balance restriction (13) is active, E(t)=Emax(t), 
or inactive, E(t)<Emax(t). In our model, the firms-polluters are the firms for which the 
restriction is active. We will consider the cases of firms-polluters and firms-non-polluters 
separately. At n=d, the long-term BGP dynamics involves the active environmental 
restriction (13) (see Theorem 3). As shown below, the transition dynamics reaches the 
restriction (13).     
    
6.2.  Optimal intensive growth (the case of a dirty firm).  
Let us assume that E(tk)=Emax(tk) starting with the instant tk, tk≥0. Also k(0)<1/r, 
otherwise no growth is possible (see Scenario 2 above). 
 
Scenario 3: The intensive growth at active environment regulation. Let tk=0. The 
optimal dynamics at t≥tk follows Case A of Theorem 1 (with the active E(t)=Emax(t) 
restriction). This regime is a growth with intensive capital renovation induced by 
technical progress. In order to make a new capital investment m(t) at t≥tk, the firm needs 
to scrap some obsolete capital m(a(t))a’(t), following equality (13) under the given 
E(t)=Emax(t). In the long-term dynamics considered in Section 3.2, the optimal R&D 
innovation R*(t) is the interior trajectory RΛ(t). The optimal R*(t) reaches the trajectory 
RΛ(t) immediately after tk. The OP has the interior turnpike trajectory aΛ for the capital 
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lifetime, determined from Im'(t)=0. If aΛ(0)=a0, then the optimal a*≡aΛ. If aΛ(0)≠a0, then 
we can show that the optimal a*(t) will reach aΛ(t) after some time at tl≥tk. If aΛ(0)<a0, 
then the optimal investment m*(t)=0 is minimal at 0<t≤tl. Later, at t>tl, the optimal m*(t) 
has cycles (the replacement echoes as in Boucekkine, Germain and Licandro, 1997) 
determined by the prehistory of m(t) on [a0, tk]. A formal proof of this optimal m*, a* 
dynamics can be done similarly to Hritonenko and Yatsenko (2005). 
Under Scenario 3, the energy price p(t) is not presented in the NCE formulas (18)-(22) 
and, therefore, it does not impact the optimal transition a*(t) and m*(t) (similarly to the 
long term dynamics) while restrictions (45) and (53) hold. Of course, an increase of the 
energy price p(t) reduces the corresponding optimal Q*(t) and c*(t). 
Figure 2 and the following simulation example illustrate this scenario.  
 
Example 2. Let  
             r=0.05,   d=n=0.5,   b=0.01,   Emax(t)= E0=10.5,    k(t)=0.12,    p(t)=0.5,  
              a0 = −2,   β0=1,   R0(τ)=0,   m0(τ)=5.25,    τ∈[−2,0].                                                  (55) 
Then, B=β(0)=1 by (16). There is the BGP, calculated in Example 1 above, 
                    RΛ(t)=R0eCt,  C=0.01,   mΛ(t)=M0 =2.1,     aΛ(t)=t–5   ,  t∈[0,∞),                         (56)    
indicated by the grey lines in Figure 2. In this case, E(0)=m0a0=5.25*2=10.5 is equal to Emax(0), 
hence, the environmental balance (13) is active starting t=0. Since aΛ(0)=−5 < a0=−2, then the 
optimal a*(t)= −2 and m*(t)=0 at 0<t≤tl=3. After tl, the optimal a*(t) coincides with the BGP 
aΛ(t) and m*(t)=m*(t-5) exhibits replacement echoes. 
 
6.3.  Optimal extensive growth (the case of a firm-non-polluter).  
This case means that the energy pollution balance E(t) at the initial state t=0 is lower than 
the limit Emax(0). Let us assume that E(t)<Emax(t) at 0≤t<tk, where the moment tk will be 
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determined. Mathematically, this case is more complicated and involves the regime 
c*(t)=0, not covered by the NCE of Theorem 1. So, we restrict ourselves with a numeric 
example and its economic interpretation and do not provide any formal proofs.   
 
Scenario 4: Extensive growth. If p(t) does not increase, then by (25), (31), and (54) 
Ia''(t)<0 and Ia'(t)<0 at a(t)≡a0. Hence, a*(t)≡a0 is optimal while E(t)<Emax(t) (see 
Example 3 below). At the same time, if β*(t) increases (and the given k(t) does not 
increase), then Im'(t)>0 by (24), hence, the optimal investment m* is maximal. So, one 
can buy a new capital and there is no need to remove the old one, i.e., we have an 
extensive growth. On the other side, by (20), IR'(t)>0 at small R*(t), hence, the optimal 
R*(t) is positive (therefore, β*(t) increases indeed). In this case, the constraint c*(t)≥0 in 
(14) limits both controls R* and m*:  
                          Q*(t) − R*(t) − k(t)β*(t)m*(t) − p(t)E*(t) ≥ 0.                                 (57) 
Then, the transition optimal dynamics on some initial period [0, tk] is determined by the 
restriction c*(t)=0 or  
                 R*(t) + k(t)β*(t)m*(t) = Q*(t) − p(t)E*(t)                                                 (58) 
until E(tk)=Emax(tk). Since the optimal m* increases, the energy regulation limit 
E(t)=Emax(t) will be reached soon and the optimal renovation dynamics will switch to 
Scenario 3 with the active constraint (13). The end tk of the initial transition period [0, tk] 
is determined from condition E(tk)= Emax(tk). 
 If the given p(t) increases indefinitely, then a*(t) is determined by (35), Ia''(t)=0, Ia'(t)=0, 
β(a*(t))=p(t), hence, a*(t) increases. If the p(t) increase is slower than the optimal 
productivity, then  the optimal capital lifetime t−a*(t) also increases while E(t)<Emax(t).  
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Example 3. Let all given parameters be as (55) in Example 2 but  
                                         m0(τ) = 2,  τ∈[−2,0].                                                           (59) 
Then the BGP (56) is the same as in Example 2 but the transition dynamics is different.  
In this case, E(0)=m0a0=2*2=4 is less than Emax(0)=10.5, hence, the environmental balance (13) is 
inactive on an initial interval [0, tk] at the beginning of the planning horizon. The dynamics of the 
optimal m*(t) and R*(t) on [0, tk] follows the restriction c*(t)=0 and is shown in  Figure 3. The 
determination of m* and R* involves additional theoretical considerations based on varying the 
equality (58). It appears that m*(t)=17.8, R*(t)=0.003 at 0≤t≤tk.  Then, the corresponding E*(t) 
increases fast and reaches the limit value Emax=10.5 at tk≈0.36. The later optimal dynamics on 
[tk,∞) is described by Case A of Theorem 1 and is similar to Scenario 3. Namely, since 
aΛ(0.36)<a0=−2, then a*(t)= −2 and the optimal m*(t)=0 is minimal during the second part of 
transition dynamics, 0.36 < t ≤ tl=3. Later, at t>3, a*(t)=aΛ(t) and the optimal m*(t)=m*(t-5) has 
replacement echoes determined by the previous dynamics on [-2, 3]. 
 
Remark 8. If the positiveness of c(t) is not assumed, then the optimal m*(t) jumps to infinity 
immediately after t=0 (because of the possibility of borrowing), so the balance E(t)=Emax(t) will 
be reached immediately after t=0. Mathematically, m*(t) involves the delta-function at t=0. Then 
the length of the transition period [0, tk] is zero. 
 
The optimal dynamics highlighted in this scenario are quite new in the related economic 
literature (see for example, Boucekkine, Germain and Licandro, 1997). They deserve 
some comments: 
i) At first, note that the modernization policy chosen by the firm consists in 
increasing investment in new equipment and R&D without scrapping the older 
and more polluting machines. In Hritonenko and Yatsenko (1996) and 
Boucekkine et al. (1997), the modernization policy also encompasses scrapping 
part of the older capital goods in a way similar to the intensive growth scenario 
described in Section 6.2. The reason behind this difference is quite elementary: 
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while in Section 6.2, investing in new machines (for fixed level of technological 
progress) is not possible without scrapping some obsolete older machines because 
of market clearing conditions or binding environmental constraints respectively, a 
firm with low enough initial capital stock (and so with low enough initial 
pollution stock) has no incentive to scrap its old machines as long as its emission 
quota constraint is not binding. 
ii) Note that in our case firms which are historically “small” polluters are precisely 
those which are historically “small” producers. Extended to a country level, our 
exercise predicts that historically poor countries will find it optimal to massively 
invest and therefore to massively pollute during their development process. 
During such a transition, new and clean machines will co-exist with old and dirty 
machines in the productive sectors, implying an unambiguously dirty transition. 
In this sense, our model provides new micro-foundations to an essential part of 
the environmental Kuznets curve (see among others, Chimeli and Braden, 2005). 
 
The next section establishes that during this transition, the unique brake on pollution 
is the energy price, which suggests a fiscal treatment of the environmental problem 
during the transition. Nonetheless, the trade-off is clear: if energy taxes are raised to 
cut energy consumption, then it will affect the pace of technological progress and 
investment negatively, featuring a kind of reverse Hicks mechanisms, as proved in the 
next section. 
 
6.4. The impact of energy price on extensive growth. 
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In the case of extensive growth (Scenario 4), the transition dynamics is directly impacted 
by the behavior of the energy price p(t) because of (25).    
Let p(t) monotonically increase. Then a*(t) increases and is uniquely determined from 
Ia'(t)=0 and (25) at a known R*, while E*(t)< Emax(t). The long term interior trajectory 
aΛ(t) defined in Section 5.1.2 satisfies the equation Im'(aΛ; t)=0. We assume that p(t) is 
not too high, so that Im'(a*; t)>0 in (21) and m*(t) is maximal during transition dynamics 
(the alternative case is Scenario 1 in Section 6.1). Then, the transition dynamics is regime 
c*(t)=0 and m*(t) and R*(t) satisfy (58) while E*(t)<Emax(t) on an initial interval [0, tk].  
We will compare the transition dynamics under two different (increasing) energy prices 
p1(t) and p2(t), p1(t) < p2(t), and indicate corresponding optimal a*(t), m*(t), and R*(t) 
with the subscripts 1 and 2. By (25), the structure of the equation Ia'(t)=0 is such that 
a1*(t)<a2*(t) while E*(t)<Emax(t). The endogenous Q*, β*, and E* are more inertial than 
m* and R*. On the other hand, the “extensive growth” part [0, tk] of transition dynamics 
is usually very short (see Example 3). Then, by (58),  
                              R1*(t) + k(t)β*(t)m1*(t) > R2*(t) + k(t)β*(t)m2*(t)                           (60)  
at [0, tk]. Involving additional reasoning based on varying the equality (58), we can prove 
that R1*(t)>R2*(t) and m1*(t)>m2*(t). Therefore, both R*(t) and m*(t) are smaller at a 
higher energy price p(t). This result can be summarized as the following property: 
 
During the transition dynamics with inactive environmental constraint, an increase of the 
energy price p(t) forces more intensive capital renovation with a shorter capital lifetime 
t-a*(t) but decreases both capital and R&D investments  R*(t) and m*(t). 
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Let us highlight the extreme case of the prices p1(t) and p2(t) such that Q(0)−p1(0)E(0)>0 
but Q(0)−p2(0)E(0)=0. Then, by (58), R*1(0) and (or) m*1(0) are positive, but 
R*2(0)=m*2(0)=0 since all given output Q(0) is spent at t=0 to buy energy because of too 
high energy price. Under natural assumptions, the production will never become 
profitable at the price p2(t). 
As outlined above, we get here a case for an inverse induced-innovation mechanism 
(under inactive environmental constraint). Higher energy prices induce shorter lifetime 
for capital goods but they depress investment in both new capital and R&D.  
 
7. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we have studied in depth the optimal behavior of firms subject to emission 
quotas and liquidity-constrained. We have spent a substantial part of the first sections of 
the paper to justify why such a problem under endogenous technical progress (that is, 
when firms spend on R&D) is crucially important to tackle. In addition, the vintage 
structure adds realism to the problem under study and considerably enriches the 
discussion. We have extracted numerous new results, either in the investigation of short-
term dynamics or in the analysis of long-run growth regimes. In most cases analyzed, the 
Porter and induced-innovation hypotheses are ruled out. 
 
A few remarks are in order. Of course, our results are based on price-taking firms and our 
modeling of liquidity-constraints is probably too simple. Adding market power is no 
problem if we follow the strategy of Feichtinger et al. (2006), although it is not likely that 
our results would be dramatically altered. Modelling and treating liquidity constraints 
more accurately is a much more complicated task both mathematically and conceptually. 
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We believe that allowing the firms to incur into debt to fasten its modernization and 
compliance to environmental standards is a quite decisive issue that should be considered 
in more comprehensive frameworks in the terms of economic policy. In this spirit, central 
planner models seem more adequate, since they would allow a much more precise 
discussion of welfare implications of different environmental and economic policies. This 
is our next step. 
 
8. Appendix 
Proof of Theorem 1: The proof uses perturbation techniques of the optimization theory 
developed for the class of models under study in Hritonenko and Yatsenko (1996), 
Yatsenko (2004), and Yatsenko and Hritonenko (2005). Let us consider Case (B) first.  
 
Case (B). If the restriction (13) is inactive, E*(t)<Emax(t) at t∈∆, then we choose R, m, 
and v=a' as the independent unknown variables of the OP. Then, the differential 
restriction a'(t)≥0 in (14) has the standard form v(t)≥0.  We assume that R, m, and v are 
measurable and R(t)e-rt, m(t)e-rt, v(t)e-rt are bounded a.e. on [0,∞). Substituting (17) to 
(16), we obtain expression (22) for β(t).    
We refer to measurable functions δR, δm, and δv as the admissible variations, if R, m, v, 
R+δR, m+δm, and v+δv, satisfy constraints (14)-(15). 
Let us give small admissible variations δR(t), δm(t), and δv(t), t∈[0,∞), to a, m, and R and 
find the corresponding variation ),,(),,( vmRIvvmmRRII −+++= δδδδ  of the objective 
functional I. Using (10)-(13), we obtain that  
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where max{a(t),0} emphasizes that the variations δR(t), δm(t) are non-zero only on the 
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Finally, recalling ∫=
t
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0
)()( ξξδδ , we convert the last expression to 
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Formula (A5) in notations (21), (24), (25) provides the required expression (A2). The 
domain (14) of admissible controls R, m, v has the simple standard form R≥0, m≥0, v≥0.  
So, the NCE (23) follows from the obvious necessary condition that the variation δΙ of 
functional Ι  can not be positive for any admissible variations δR(t), δm(t), δv(t), t∈[0,∞).   
Case (A). If the restriction of (13) is active: E(t) = Emax(t) at t∈∆⊂[0,∞), then we choose 
R and m as the independent unknowns of the OP. The dependent (state) variable a is 
uniquely determined from the initial problem  
           m(a(t))a′(t) = m(t) − Emax′(t),     a(0)= a0, 
obtained after differentiating (13). As shown in Hritonenko and Yatsenko (2006), if 
Emax′(t)≤0, then for any measurable m(t)≥0, a unique a.e. continuous function a(t)<t 
exists and a.e. has a'(t)≥0 (see Remark 1 about the possible case Emax′(t)>0). Therefore, 
the state restrictions a'(t)≥0 and a(t)<t in (14) are satisfied automatically, so we can 
exclude a from the extremum condition.  
Similarly to the previous case, let us give small admissible variations δR(t) and δm(t), 
t∈[0,∞), to R and m and find the corresponding variation ),(),( mRImmRRII −++= δδδ  
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of the functional I. In this case, the variation δa is determined by δm. To find their 
connection, let us present (13) as    
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We will use the above formula (A4) for the variation δI as a function of δR, δm, and δa 
and eliminate δa from (A4) using (A6). To do that, we rewrite the third term of (D4) as 
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)())()(( −∫+ in (A7) has the order o(δa) because β(τ) is continuous.  
Substituting (A7) into (A4) and collecting the coefficients of δm and δR, we obtain the 
expression  
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0
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in the notations (20) and (21). The rest of the proof is identical to Case B. 
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 The Theorem is proven.      
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Figure 1. Solving the nonlinear equation (45) with respect to the unknown Cx = .  
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Figure 2. Transition and long-term dynamics under active environment regulation from Example 
2 (at specific initial conditions a0 and m0). The dotted lines indicate the BGP regime. The dashed 
line shows the inverse function a-1. 
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Figure 3. Transition and long-term dynamics under inactive environment regulation from 
Example 3. The optimal dynamics at active regulation (Example 2) is shown in grey color. 
